vites the replacement of one with the other. PDP connectionism provides a synthetic perspective on the dialectical tension created by this play of apparent opposites by centering inquiry on constructivist network principles that govern the emergence of mind from brain. Connectionism brings postmodernist constructive assumptions to bear regarding how perceptions, cognitions, and behavior are synthesized within a cultural context and therefore should be of interest to all psychologists.
Gergen dropped several hints to the careful reader as to the true nature of this school of thought. The author appeared to be motivated by a concern with the reaction of scientifically oriented psychologists, whom he believed may have been put off by their interpretation that postmodernism is inherently incompatible with their worldview and work.
One has to recognize the social and historical context in which postmodernism has emerged to properly appreciate its manifestations. Early in the 20th century, the artistic and literary movement of Dada arose, inspiring later avant-garde movements and profoundly influencing communication mediums as disparate as political protest and advertising. The Dadaists did not intend to create works of art for collectors or galleries but rather to provoke the public into reacting to their activities. One aspect of Dada was the promulgation of confusion or wonder: The artists created posters containing randomly arranged letters of the alphabet, read poems simultaneously in three languages, and distributed leaflets with incomprehensible manifestos and increasingly bizarre demands (see Shipe, 2000) .
Postmodernism retains aspects of these earlier works. Gergen (2001) revealed that postmodernists are concerned with philosophical speculation for the sake of intellectual discourse rather than the pursuit of truth or knowledge. In sharp contrast to scientists concerned with the reduction of uncertainty, the generation of knowledge, and the search for truth, "the postmodernist proposes that arguments about what is really real are futile" (Gergen, 2001, p. 806 ). Gergen's postmodern constructionism "makes no claims for the truth, objectivity, universality, or moral superiority of [even] its own position . . . postmodern critiques are themselves without foundations" (Gergen, 2001, pp. 807-808) . When scientists assume that postmodernists share their goals and motivations for creating discussion, it creates a volatile misunderstanding that may be responsible for part of the defensive posture that Gergen alluded to.
Whereas science is concerned with the simplification and comprehension of information, postmodernists are interested in the elaboration of ideas and even obfuscation. The founders of Dada took great delight in their heated debates about the origin and meaning of the name Dada, which was probably chosen for its nonsensical repetition of syllables. Postmodernists value the luxury of the discussion of all possible ideas rather than seeking to determine veracity. A postmodernist should even appreciate the controversy and apparent embarrassment that Alan Sokal created with his parody of postmodernism (Sokal, 1996) because it led to a florid discussion of ideas (see http:// www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/).
Another similarity many postmodernists share with their predecessors is a concern for societal conditions. The Dadaists were partially a product of the chaotic atmosphere during and shortly after the First World War, and they sought to critique the world around them. Once again in postmodernism, there is a dualism between the expression of abstract ideas and the concrete concern with social issues. If postmodernists adhered to their own perspective that nothing can be certain, how could they passionately analyze existing social conditions, as Gergen (2001, p. 809) stated? In the postmodernist's concern with pragmatic outcomes, there is an implicit assumption of a knowable reality that can be measured and changed through an individual's thoughts and actions. Gergen even acknowledged that postmodernists make value judgments, for example, that oppression is objectionable.
Gergen (and perhaps others) wishes to return psychology to a prescientific subset of philosophy. Freed from the constraints of empirical substantiation, theoretical psychology could generate vast new accounts and explanations of human thought and behavior. However, this may not facilitate the anticipated dialogue with psychological science. Researchers may perceive untested speculation as a luxury that cannot be afforded, considering the informational treasures already waiting to be discovered.
Just as one may be reassured when a sleight of hand trick or the solution to a riddle is revealed, one might imagine that scientists can rest easy once they know the true nature of postmodernism. However, Gergen (2001) emphasized that postmodernism has already had a major impact in the other social sciences. Friction and factions now beset these fields, and it may take years to reorient from this detour. In addition, there is a danger that the public is being adversely affected by these indulgent thought experiments. In a world where the teaching of evolution by natural selection is still controversial in some regions, the fragile scientific literacy of the general public should be carefully cultivated.
One may even interpret the rise of postmodernism in the context of an academic turf war between sections of the liberal arts and the sciences. Some might encourage the postmodern questioning of science in reaction to the increasing discrepancies in funding between departments and the erosion of the traditional core curriculum of humanities at many institutions. It is likely that psychologists and other scientists would support the preservation and vitalization of the humanities in academia if approached in a more straightforward manner.
In sum, the apparent relativism and perplexity in postmodernism results from the valuation of ideas for their own sake rather DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.57.6-7.456 than for the refinement of understanding. Psychologists and other scientists may now move comfortably from isolation to understanding. Once aware of postmodernism's true nature, psychologists and other scientists will be better prepared for postmodern dialogue, although they might choose not to partake in this thought experiment. In any case, one may rest assured that postmodernists will always be eager for a good chat.
Truth, Method, and Postmodern Psychology
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Gergen's (October 2001) recent advocacy of a postmodern conception of psychological science constitutes a direct challenge to psychology as it is commonly understood and practiced. I consider two of his major criticisms. The first criticism involves questioning the widely held belief that psychological research endeavors to capture the truth about reality, and the second asserts that new qualitative psychological methods have flourished in the face of damaging criticisms of orthodox methods. In this commentary, I defend the view that a theory of truth is important for science and suggest that a cautious approach to the use of these new methods in psychology be adopted.
Truth as Correspondence
An important part of Gergen's (1990 Gergen's ( , 1994a Gergen's ( , 2001 ) postmodern critique of mainstream psychology has challenged the notion that science should be viewed as a truth-seeking endeavor. Specifically, Gergen has rejected the long-standing idea that truth involves a correspondence relation between language and the world. He has maintained that language does not function assertively to picture or map reality and that science does not accurately describe the world. Rather, language is a performative act in which one variously declares, promises, requests, questions, and the like, whereas postmodern science itself takes intelligibility, not objectivity, to be the major desideratum of research. Gergen has expressed a further related worry about correspondence truth, which he described as the impossible quest to secure truth through the use of method. I find Gergen's case for suggesting that researchers give up on truth unconvincing for a number of reasons: He has conflated the notions of truth and acceptance, he has saddled correspondence theorists with a naïve view of the correspondence relation, and he has failed to appreciate that correspondence truth can function as a useful theoretical posit in a broad theory of science.
In objecting to the empiricist tradition of emphasizing truth through method, Gergen (2001) rightly declared that correspondence with reality cannot furnish a criterion for justifying knowledge claims. However, from this it does not follow that a theory of correspondence truth does not have a legitimate role in a realistic theory of science. Drawing an epistemic distinction between truth and justification is of crucial importance here. Truth, understood as correspondence with reality, functions as a guiding ideal for science. As such, it is a highly valued, though unattainable, goal that helps make sense of science as an attempt to represent and intervene in the world. However, as an ideal, truth is only accessible indirectly by way of the various criteria one uses to evaluate and accept theories. Empirical adequacy, logical coherence, and explanatory power are three important criteria of theory acceptance. As justificatory criteria, they can be indicative of truth, but they are not constitutive of truth.
In rejecting the notion of truth as correspondence with reality, Gergen (2001) ran together two quite different conceptions of the correspondence relation: mirroring and mapping. To say that a theory reflects the world is to maintain that theories somehow mirror or copy reality, and that is clearly implausible. Yet this is a caricature of the contemporary formulation of the correspondence relation as a mapping relation. To view the correspondence relation as a mapping relation is both plausible and suggestive. In short, maps enable one to get in touch with the world by representing reality in a structure-preserving way (Hooker, 1987) . In the absence of an examination of the nature of mapping, Gergen's dismissal of the correspondence theory of truth was premature.
The importance of correspondence truth for science lies in regarding it not just as part of a theory of semantics but also as a theoretical posit within a broader framework of cognitive theory (Hooker, 1987) . Here truth is taken to be a relation between cognition and the world. As a theoretical posit, correspondence truth performs a number of functions. Two important functions are that it underwrites the notion of error and that it helps to explain why scientists often strive for a faithful representation of reality.
The Reliability of Methods
Over the years, Gergen (1994a Gergen ( , 1994b has criticized psychological research methodology for promoting a method-centered view of science that includes a commitment to quantitative methods such as experimentation, metaanalysis, and theory testing through inductive and hypotheticodeductive methods. More recently (Gergen, 2001) , he has welcomed the emergence of a plethora of qualitative research methods (e.g., Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) that he believes will be a boon to psychological researchers. Gergen's view of method can be challenged in a number of ways.
First, although there is a great deal more to science than method (aims, theories, and institutions are also important), method is central. Most of what is known in science has been acquired through the application of methods. This holds for the knowledge of substantive matters, values, and even method itself. Second, Gergen's criticisms of experimentation and meta-analysis have been effectively countered by others (e.g., Gage, 1996) . However, inductive methods, including many of psychology's statistical methods, are appropriate tools for the detection of empirical phenomena, whereas nonsimplistic versions of the hypotheticodeductive method can test local hypotheses for their predictive worth. Third, it must be acknowledged that qualitative methods can do important work in psychological research (e.g., the use of grounded theory method for theory construction). However, for many of the new methods that Gergen listed, there is no evidence that they are reliable methods of knowledge production. They should, therefore, be used with extreme caution. Trout's (1998) recent demonstration that narrative methods such as verstehen techniques and ordinary attribution procedures are susceptible to bias and unreliability is a telling case in point. There is an irony in the fact that an expanding array of new methods not used by postmodernists (e.g., meta-analysis, structural equation modeling, the theory of explanatory coherence) have been shown empirically to reliably meet their appropriate research goals when they are used properly.
Enlightenment Science
Postmodern thinkers have mounted a number of attacks on the widely accepted modern men-DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.57. 6-7.457 
